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Baccara chemin de fer — review of main contributions
Baccara was first mentioned in print by Van Tenac in 1847.
It was analyzed by Dormoy in 1872 and Bertrand in 1889.
Borel called Bertrand’s study “extremely incomplete,” but it motivated
Borel to develop game theory in the 1920s.
Von Neumann planned to study baccara after proving the minimax
theorem in 1928, but he didn’t.
The first game-theoretic solution was by Kemeny and Snell in 1957.
In 1964, Foster gave a solution based on a new algorithm, unaware of the
Kemeny–Snell solution.
A solution under more realistic assumptions was found by Downton and
Lockwood in 1975 using Foster’s algorithm.
Based on the extensive form of the game, the Kemeny–Snell solution
was rederived by Deloche and Oguer in 2007.
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The rules of baccara chemin de fer
We consider the classical parlor game, not the modern casino game.
Dealt from a sabot, or shoe, containing six 52-card decks.
Cards A, 2–9, 10, J, Q, K have values 1, 2–9, 0, 0, 0, 0.
The total of a hand, comprising two or three cards, is the sum of the
values, modulo 10 (i.e., only the last digit of the sum is used).
Two cards are dealt face down to Player, two face down to Banker.
If either Player or Banker has a two-card total of 8 or 9 (a natural), the
game is over.
If not, Player has the option of requesting a third card, dealt face up.
Player must draw to 4 or less, stand on 6 and 7. Player has a choice on 5.
Then Banker, seeing Player’s third card if any, has the option of
requesting a third card. (There are no restrictions on Banker’s strategy
under classical rules.)
Hands are compared, with the total closer to 9 winning. A tie is a push.
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Other forms of baccarat
In the modern casino game of baccara chemin de fer, Banker’s strategy is
highly constrained, and the casino collects a 5% commission on Banker
wins. This is a two-person game but but not a zero-sum game, as we will
point out below.
Baccara en banque or baccara à deux tableaux was popularized by the
Prince of Wales (in the Royal Baccarat Scandal of 1891) and by Nicolas
Zographos (of the Greek Syndicate of the post-WWI, pre-WWII era).
Here two Player hands compete against one Banker hand, so this is a
three-person game.
In punto banco (modern casino baccarat), there are no strategy choices
for Player or Banker, so this is not a strategic game. However,
house-banked bets are available on Player as well as on Banker. A
winning Banker bet pays 19 to 20 (equivalent to a 5% commission on
Banker wins).
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The concept of a matrix game
An m× n matrix game is a two-person zero-sum strategic game in which
Player I has m pure strategies and Player II has n pure strategies. It is
specified by the payoff matrix
A =

1 2 · · · n
1 a11 a12 · · · a1n





m am1 am2 · · · amn
,
the (i, j)th entry of which is the expected payoff to player I if player I adopts





R 0 1 −1
S −1 0 1
P 1 −1 0

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Baccarat: The parlor game vs. the casino game
parlor game
event (Player payoff, Banker payoff) sum of payoffs
Player win (1,−1) 0
Banker win (−1, 1) 0
Tie (0, 0) 0
casino game
event (Player payoff, Banker payoff) sum of payoffs
Player win (1,−1) 0
Banker win (−1, 19/20) −1/20
Tie (0, 0) 0
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Modeling baccara as a matrix game
We classify baccara models in two ways. First, according to how cards are
dealt.
Model A. Cards are dealt with replacement from a single deck.
Model B. Cards are dealt without replacement from a d-deck shoe.
Second, according what Player and Banker see.
Model 1. Each of Player and Banker sees the total of his own two-card
hand but not its composition. (2× 288)
Model 2. Banker sees the composition of his own two-card hand while
Player sees only his own total. (2× 2484)
Model 3. Each of Player and Banker sees the composition of his own
two-card hand. (25 × 2484)
Model A1: Kemeny and Snell (1957).
Model B2: Downton and Lockwood (1975).
Model B3: our focus.
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What was the purpose of this research?
We wanted to answer the following questions:
What do the exactly optimal composition-dependent strategies, for
Player and Banker, look like? [The answer is that each of Player and
Banker mixes two of his pure strategies.]
Would software not available in 1975 (namely, computer-algebra
software such as Mathematica) allow a more complete solution than that
of Downton and Lockwood? [The answer is yes.]
Most important, is there an algorithm for solving a large game (e.g.,
25 × 2484) of the type that appears in baccara? (Foster’s algorithm
applies only to certain 2× 2n games.) [The answer is yes, not necessarily
in general but at least in this case.]
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Banker strategy under Model A1
First step: Eliminate strictly dominated Banker strategies.
Banker’s Player’s third card (∅ if Player stands)
total 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅
0, 1, 2 D D D D D D D D D D D
3 D D D D D D D D S ∗ D
4 S ∗ D D D D D D S S D
5 S S S S ∗ D D D S S D
6 S S S S S S D D S S ∗
7 S S S S S S S S S S S
D means draw, S means stand
∗ means uncertain—depends on Player’s strategy
This reduces the game from 2× 288 to 2× 24.
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Solution under Model A1
Second step: Solve the 2× 16 game.
Player:
5: (D,S) with probabilities (9/11, 2/11).




(6,∅): (D,S) with probabilities (859/2288, 1429/2288).
Value of game to Player (pushes included):
V = − 679 568
53 094 899
≈ −0.0127991.
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Banker strategy under Model B3, d = 6
First step: Eliminate strictly dominated Banker strategies.
Banker’s Banker’s Player’s third card (∅ if Player stands)
total hand 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅
0, 1, 2 D D D D D D D D D D D
3 D D D D D D D D S ∗ D
4 (0, 4), (1, 3), (5, 9) S S D D D D D D S S D
4 (2, 2), (6, 8), (7, 7) S ∗ D D D D D D S S D
5 (0, 5), (6, 9), (7, 8) S S S S ∗ D D D S S D
5 (1, 4), (2, 3) S S S S S D D D S S D
6 (3, 3) S S S S S S ∗ D S S ∗
6 all others S S S S S S D D S S ∗
7 S S S S S S S S S S S
This reduces the game from 25 × 2484 to 25 × 218.
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Solution under Model B3, d = 6 (Baccara solved!)
Player’s two-card hand optimal move
(0, 5), (6, 9), (7, 8) D
(1, 4) (D,S)
(2, 3) S
Banker’s Player’s third card (∅ if Player stands)
total 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅
0, 1, 2 D D D D D D D D D D D
3 D D D D D D D D S D D
4 S S D D D D D D S S D
5 S S S S ∗ D D D S S D
6 S S S S S S D D S S †
7 S S S S S S S S S S S
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Footnotes and parameters
∗Banker’s two-card total is 5 and Player’s third card is 4: D on
(0, 5), (6, 9), (7, 8), S on (1, 4), (2, 3).
†Banker’s two-card total is 6 and Player stands: (D,S) on (0, 6), S on
(1, 5), (2, 4), (3, 3), (7, 9), D on (8, 8).










The value of the game (to Player) is
V = − 73 356 216 203 119
5 712 649 844 821 920
≈ −0.0128410.
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What is missing from this presentation?
Solution under Model B3 for every positive integer d. For d ≥ 9, the
parameters p, q, and V are given by formulas (rational functions of d).
Solutions under Models B1 and B2 for every positive integer d. Here the
solutions can be shown to be unique.
Solutions under Models A2 and A3. Here there are multiple optimal
strategies.
Proofs of optimality in all cases.
Want more detail? Then download our (28-page) paper at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.5468.
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